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During the past decade, a large body of research has shown that memory traces can become labile upon
retrieval and must be restabilized. Critically, interrupting this reconsolidation process can abolish a previously
stable memory. Although a large number of studies have demonstrated this reconsolidation associated
amnesia in nonhuman animals, the evidence for its occurrence in humans is far less compelling, especially
with regard to declarative memory. In fact, reactivating a declarative memory often makes it more robust and
less susceptible to subsequent disruptions. Here we show that existing declarative memories can be selectively
impaired by using a noninvasive retrieval–relearning technique. In six experiments, we show that this
reconsolidation-associated amnesia can be achieved 48 h after formation of the original memory, but only if
relearning occurred soon after retrieval. Furthermore, the amnesic effect persists for at least 24 h, cannot be
attributed solely to source confusion and is attainable only when relearning targets specific existing memories
for impairment. These results demonstrate that human declarative memory can be selectively rewritten during
reconsolidation.
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Abstract 
Over the past decade, a large body of research has shown that memory traces can become labile 
upon retrieval and must be restabilized.  Critically, interrupting this reconsolidation process can 
abolish a previously stable memory.  Although a large number of studies have demonstrated this 
reconsolidation associated amnesia in non-human animals, the evidence for its occurrence in 
humans is far less compelling, especially with regard to declarative memory.  In fact, 
reactivating a declarative memory often makes it more robust and less susceptible to subsequent 
disruptions.  Here we show that existing declarative memories can be selectively impaired using 
a noninvasive retrieval-relearning technique.  In six experiments, we show that this 
reconsolidation associated amnesia can be achieved 48 hr after formation of the original 
memory, but only if relearning occurred soon after retrieval.  Furthermore, the amnesic effect 
persists for at least 24 hr, cannot be attributed solely to source confusion, and is attainable only 
when relearning targets specific existing memories for impairment.  These results demonstrate 
that human declarative memory can be selectively rewritten during reconsolidation. 
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The entrenched view that memory becomes permanent upon consolidation has faced 
considerable scrutiny based on recent works demonstrating that retrieval can destabilize existing 
memories, and that the reactivated memories need to be reconsolidated (1, 2).  Over the past 
decade, a growing body of evidence has revealed the chemical and molecular nature of 
reconsolidation and its behavioral consequences (3).  Critically, when a consolidated memory 
(e.g., a conditioned fear response) is retrieved, it becomes labile and requires protein synthesis 
for restabilization, and later retrieval of that memory can be severely impaired if an amnesic 
treatment is administered during the reconsolidation process.   
 Despite the proliferation of research on reconsolidation, few studies have involved human 
subjects, perhaps because most pharmacological consolidation blockers are unsuitable for human 
use (3, 4).  When reconsolidation associated memory impairments are demonstrated in humans, 
the effects have been limited to fear conditioning (5-8), motor sequence learning (9), and drug 
induced craving (10).  To date, no study has shown reconsolidation associated impairment in 
declarative memory.  Indeed, even when oral administration of propranolol (a systemic 
pharmacological consolidation blocker approved for human use) reduced the emotional response 
associated with a fear-inducing experience (6, 7), it left the declarative recollection intact*.  
Although several studies have examined whether existing declarative memories can be impaired 
by interference upon reactivation, none has shown memory impairments similar to those 
regularly exhibited in fear conditioning.  Moreover, these studies used a reminder to trigger 
reactivation of the original memory while prohibiting subjects from actually retrieving that 
memory (e.g., by briefly mentioning the learning episode without asking about what was 
learned); thus, it is unclear whether retrieval of the original memory (and thus reconsolidation) 
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actually occurred (11-16).  When retrieval of a learned response is ascertained through a memory 
test, the results almost unequivocally show that retrieval actually makes the original memory 
less, not more, susceptible to interference (17-20).  In sum, scant evidence exists to support the 
idea that declarative memory undergoes reconsolidation upon retrieval.  
 Distinct neural systems subserve the formation and retrieval of fear, motor, and 
declarative memory (21).  Whereas memories acquired via fear conditioning or motor sequence 
learning can be relatively localized neurologically (22), the encoding and retrieval of declarative 
memories rely on a more distributed network (23-27).  This complexity might be one reason why 
declarative memory is particularly resistant to treatments designed to disrupt reconsolidation.  
Here we show that human declarative memory can be selectively impaired in a behavioral 
paradigm without the administration of harmful pharmacological agents; these results 
demonstrate that declarative memory, too, is susceptible to reactivation-induced lability.  
Results 
Experiment 1: Targeting specific declarative memories for impairment in humans  
 In the present study, we used a retrieval-relearning procedure to disrupt reconsolidation 
of the original memory (see fig. 1).  Participants watched a video about a fictional terrorist attack 
during the original learning phase.  Our key manipulation was whether subjects recalled specific 
details from the original learning episode (e.g., a terrorist used a hypodermic needle on a flight 
attendant) before they encountered new information (i.e., misinformation) that replaced the 
original information (the terrorist used a stun gun).  Performance during the reactivation phase 
indicates moderate retention, see fig. 2.  This is important because very strong memories are 
resistant to post-reactivation amnesic treatments (28, 29).  Moreover, when recall performance 
during the reactivation phase was examined based on item type (i.e., whether an item would be 
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re-presented, omitted, or misinformed during the subsequent relearning phase), no difference 
emerged across any experiments, Fs < 1.86, Ps > .17.  Therefore, any difference in performance 
across item type during the final test could not be attributed to baserate differences.   
If retrieval triggers reconsolidation of the original memory, then the new information 
presented during the relearning phase should update the original memory and render it 
inaccessible.  To assess whether amnesia of the original memory had occurred, we compared 
participants’ ability to recognize the original item depending on whether the item was replaced 
by misinformation (misinformed items) or not (neutral items).  Impairment of the original 
memory is indicated by poorer recognition performance of the misinformed items relative to the 
neutral items.  All statistical analyses were performed two-tailed with an alpha level of 0.05, and 
the dependent variable was hit rate – false alarm rate unless noted otherwise.   
 Much research effort has been devoted to uncovering whether existing declarative 
memories can be erased by learning new materials (without the reactivation component), and the 
results have been underwhelming (30).  Consistent with these findings, results in Experiment 1 
(n = 146) showed that relearning produced no impairment of the original memory in the absence 
of reactivation (t = 0.002, see the first white bar in fig. 3).  In contrast, when relearning occurred 
after the original memory was reactivated, it markedly reduced recognition performance (i.e., M 
= 0.55 for neutral items and M = 0.36 for misinformed items), t(69) = 3.74, P < 0.05, d = 0.57  
(see the first gray bar in fig. 3).  Thus, the findings in Experiment 1 suggest that our retrieval-
relearning procedure disrupted the reconsolidation process; moreover, they show that under some 
circumstances (namely, when retrieval precedes relearning – a manipulation rarely included in 
the psychological research of eyewitness memory), misinformation can indeed impair 
subsequent retrieval of the original memory. 
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Experiments 2 and 3: Reconsolidation impairment in declarative memory is time-
dependent  
 In Experiments 2 (n = 64) and 3 (n = 64), we examined whether the amnesic effect 
produced by this retrieval-relearning manipulation is time dependent.  In Experiment 2, a 48 hr 
(instead of 20 min) delay separated reactivation and relearning (fig. 1).  If the memory 
impairment seen in Experiment 1 was based on reconsolidation disruption, it should be 
eliminated here because relearning occurred long after closure of the reconsolidation window (5, 
10).  Indeed, the relearning procedure now produced no memory impairment regardless of 
whether it occurred after reactivation, t = 0.96, or not, t = 0.30 (fig. 2).  In Experiment 3, a 48 hr 
delay separated original learning and reactivation (fig. 1), and the relearning phase occurred 
immediately after reactivation.  If the memory impairment in Experiment 1 was due to 
reconsolidation disruption, it should resurface in Experiment 3, even though the original memory 
has had sufficient time (48 hr) to fully consolidate following initial encoding.  Consistent with 
our prediction, the relearning procedure once again produced substantial amnesia for the original 
item (M = 0.40 for neutral items and M = 0.15 for misinformed items), t(31) = 3.50, P < 0.05, d = 
0.82 (fig. 3), but only when it occurred after retrieval (t = 0.25 without retrieval). 
Experiment 4: Reconsolidation associated amnesia cannot be explained solely by source 
confusions 
 Having established the time-dependent nature of this retrieval-relearning amnesia, we 
sought to rule out source confusion as the basis of this effect.  Two recent papers have reported 
that when people are reminded of the original learning episode immediately before new learning, 
they often misattribute details encountered during the new learning phase to the original learning 
phase (11, 31).  Therefore, it is possible that our manipulation did not produce an amnesic effect 
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on the original memory per se; rather, recognition performance was reduced due to source 
confusions.  Specifically, participants might remember the original item but were unable to 
discern whether the item was encountered during original learning or relearning.  Such doubts 
could cause participants to adopt a more conservative response criterion in a recognition test, 
thus reducing the hit rate without affecting accessibility of the original memory.  To address this 
possibility, we administered a source-free recognition test in Experiment 4 (n = 72).  Participants 
were told to respond "old" if they remembered the information from either the original learning 
phase or the relearning phase and to respond "new" otherwise.  As with former studies, the 
dependent variable of interest in source-free recognition is the hit rate (32).  If the amnesic effect 
reported in Experiments 1 and 3 were based only on source confusions and not true memory 
impairment, then it should not occur here.  Contrary to this possibility, the retrieval-relearning 
amnesia remained (M = 0.73 for neutral items and M = 0.60 for misinformed items), t(35) = 2.10, 
P < 0.05, d = 0.50 (and again relearning produced no amnesia without reactivation, t = 0.20, fig. 
3).  From a procedural standpoint, this experiment is highly comparable to Experiment 1, and the 
effect size of the reconsolidation associated amnesia was similar in these experiments (d = 0.57 
for Experiment 1 and d = 0.50 for the present experiment), which suggests that using source free 
recognition did not diminish the magnitude of reconsolidation associated amnesia appreciably.  
Nonetheless, the effect size was numerically smaller in the present experiment; thus, consistent 
with prior research (11, 31), reactivation-induced source confusions might have played a partial 
role in the memory impairment observed in the previous experiments. 
Experiment 5: Specificity of memory replacement 
 In Experiment 5 (n = 84), we attempted to address why previous studies have not 
discovered reconsolidation associated amnesia in declarative memory.  More broadly, because 
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encoding of new information happens on an ongoing basis in “real life” situations, why would 
such encoding not disrupt reconsolidation of a recently retrieved memory?  To this end, we 
examined whether specific, rather than nonspecific, interference (33) is the key to demonstrating 
this reactivation-relearning amnesia effect.  We suspect that the post-reactivation interfering 
agent must compete directly with, or replace, the originally learned information for memory 
impairment to occur (3, 34, 35).  This would explain why systemic administration of propranolol 
(6) and learning of a new set of materials (12, 13, 15, 17) do not always produce amnesia of the 
original memory.  Importantly, even in Pavlovian conditioning, reconsolidation associated 
amnesia is found only when a direct association exists between the interfering agent and the 
original memory (36).  To test the idea that specific interference is needed to alter a reactivated 
memory, we modified Experiment 1 so that the relearning narrative presented the same 
misinformation (e.g., a stun gun) but in the context of an unrelated story about drug trafficking 
(see table S1 for details), thus turning the relearning phase into a new learning phase (i.e., 
nonspecific interference).  As expected, the relearning procedure no longer impaired recognition 
performance, regardless of whether it followed retrieval, t = 0.99, or not, t = 0.45.  More broadly, 
results from this experiment clarified why humans do not demonstrate reconsolidation associated 
amnesia following recall in everyday life, despite constant interference from new encoding 
opportunities whenever one is awake.  
Experiment 6: Disrupting reconsolidation produces persistent amnesia 
 In the first five experiments, the retention interval that separated relearning and the final 
test was 5 min.  Consequently, it is unclear whether our retrieval-relearning procedure can cause 
long-term amnesia of the original memory.  In Experiment 6 (n = 66), we examined the 
persistence of the reconsolidation associated amnesia following a 24 hr delay.  Because 
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fluctuations in the forgetting function of human declarative memory stabilize substantially after 
24 hours, the data from this experiment would likely generalize to longer retention intervals (37).  
In addition, we inserted a 24 hr delay between original learning and the reactivation phase.  
Similar to Experiment 3, this delay allowed the original memory trace to more fully consolidate 
before it was reactivated.  Thus, Experiment 6 was conducted over three consecutive days, with 
the original learning occurring on the first day, the retrieval and relearning phases occurring on 
the second day, and the final memory assessment occurring on the third day.  Critically, memory 
deficits based on temporary suppression typically rebounds over time (38), so if the retrieval-
relearning amnesia effect is based on short-lived inhibition or interference mechanisms, it should 
be eliminated in this experiment.  Contrary to this possibility, relearning again caused forgetting 
of the original memory only when it followed retrieval (M = 0.38 for neutral items and M = 0.25 
for misinformed items), t(32) = 2.04, P < 0.05, d = 0.34 (no-retrieval, t = -0.72). 
Disruption of reconsolidation occurs despite successful retrieval of the original memory 
 We found recognition impairment due to the retrieval-relearning procedure in 
Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6 (and as predicted, no impairment was observed in Experiments 2 and 
5).  One question is whether this amnesic effect was driven only by items that people could not 
recall during the reactivation phase (i.e., weaker memories) or if the effect occurred even for 
items that were correctly recalled during the reactivation phase (i.e., stronger memories).  To 
address this question, we reanalyzed the results of Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6 by examining 
recognition performance for only the items that were correctly recalled during reactivation.  
Remarkably, substantial relearning-induced amnesia is observed even for these initially 
recallable (and therefore strong) items.  Across the four experiments, the average mean 
recognition probability was .89 for the neutral items and .62 for the misinformed items, with 
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significant impairment in each of the four experiments, ts > 2.14, Ps < .05, ds > .55†.  These 
results are particularly noteworthy because initially recallable items are almost always 
recognized (39), but relearning during reconsolidation had produced dramatic forgetting of these 
originally recallable memories. 
 To further investigate the effects of the reactivation-relearning procedure on subsequent 
memory performance, we conducted three additional analyses.  First, we examined whether 
reactivation affected the likelihood that one would demonstrate memory impairment (see Table 
S2).  Second, we examined whether reactivation affected the magnitude of memory impairment 
(see Table S3).  Third, we examined whether reactivation affected the response latency 
associated with recognition decisions (see Table S4).  Details regarding all of these analyses and 
the logic behind them are presented in the SI. 
Discussion 
 Decades of behavioral research in humans has revealed that it is trivially easy to alter 
people’s memory reports and to create false memories (40), but the question surrounding 
whether it is possible to experimentally erase existing memories in humans has been far more 
contentious (30).  Here, we demonstrate that retrieval can destabilize a declarative memory and 
render it susceptible to an amnesic treatment by relearning even after a substantial delay (i.e., at 
least 48 hr).  Consistent with the known preconditions of reconsolidation, the timing of post-
retrieval amnesic treatment is critical, such that relearning impairs the original memory only 
when it occurs within the reconsolidation window.  Note that compared to other studies that have 
investigated the time course of reconsolidation, our experiments used retention intervals that are 
at the more extreme ends of the spectrum (e.g., immediate vs. 48 hr), whereas some other studies 
have used more fine-grained comparisons.  These studies typically show that the reconsolidation 
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window may last somewhere between one and six hours.  We opted for a more extreme 
comparison because it was not clear whether the time-related parameters found with nonhuman 
animals (41, 42) and non-declarative memory in humans (5, 10) are applicable to declarative 
memory.  Future research is needed to better specify the time course of reconsolidation in human 
declarative memory. 
In addition to the time-dependent properties of the effect, we have shown that reactivated 
memories are vulnerable only to interference that specifically targets existing memories, but are 
robust to nonspecific interference produced by new learning.  Moreover, this effect persists for at 
least 24 hr and cannot be attributed solely to source confusions.  When the relearning procedure 
targeted specific recollections for impairment, considerable amnesia was observed across the 
four experiments in which we expected reconsolidation disruption.  However, when relearning 
occurred without reactivation of the original memory, it produced no impairments in 
performance across all six experiments (a nonsignificant rise of 3% in performance). 
 Although our data suggest that one can target specific existing memories for impairment 
following their reactivation, we believe that specific interference might be necessary, but not 
sufficient, to disrupt reconsolidation of declarative memory.  On a processing level, it is unlikely 
for people to update an original memory unless they believe that the new learning phase 
accurately re-presents the original information.  We suspect that a key to impairing the original 
memory is that relearning does not trigger spontaneous retrieval of the original information.  
Instead, reactivation of the original memory must occur prior to, but not concurrently with, 
relearning.  Recalling the original memory while encoding the new one would likely cause 
people to either discount the new information or to remember both the new and original 
information, which would likely eliminate the updating effect.  In a similar vein, research on 
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eyewitness suggestibility has shown that people are highly resistant to suggestions by 
misinformation if they detect a conflict between what was originally learned and the 
misinformation (43, 44).  Thus, we believe that the expectation under which relearning occurs 
can determine whether the retrieval-relearning procedure would lead to enhancement or amnesia 
of the original memory.   
 One may wonder whether participants who received the initial test were more likely to 
accept the misinformation as true and thus less likely to recognize the original details during the 
final test.  This could occur if participants, after having their memory tested during the 
reactivation phase, thought that the experimenter was giving them corrective feedback during the 
relearning phase.  In other words, the retrieval-relearning procedure might have changed 
participants’ belief about what was correct without actually changing memory.  If this were the 
case, we should not have observed time-dependent reconsolidation associated amnesia (in 
Experiments 2 and 3), nor should we have obtained the effect in the source-free recognition test 
(in Experiment 4), where participants were told to respond based on their memory of both the 
original learning and relearning phases. 
 The malleability of human declarative memory has been a major topic of research for 
decades (40, 45).  Recently, the instability of memory following reactivation has been suggested 
to play a key role in the production and implantation of erroneous memories (46).  While the 
unreliability of declarative memory is typically considered a disadvantage, our results show that 
it is possible to leverage the lability of reactivated engrams for targeted impairment, thus 
providing a noninvasive method to weaken the impact of unwanted memories.  Aside from its 
noninvasive nature, this technique is particularly powerful because one can target specific 
recollections for impairment while sparing others.  Humans are notoriously inept at suppressing 
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unwanted thoughts (47).  In fact, attempting to block unwanted thoughts from consciousness 
often leads to the opposite effect (48).  Remarkably, when treating post-traumatic stress 
disorders, therapeutic techniques that require patients to recall their traumatic memories (e.g., 
exposure, acceptance, and paradoxical approaches) are typically far more successful than 
suppression (49-51).  For example, a form of acceptance therapy requires patients to recall their 
intrusive thoughts and reinterpret them in a safe context (e.g., imagine the thought as a band of 
marching soldiers emerging from the ears).  Existing explanations have ascribed the efficacy of 
these approaches to the acceptance of the unwanted events as belonging to the past and to 
detaching oneself from the negative feelings associated with the experience (52).  Based on the 
present findings, it is possible that these techniques are successful because they are, at some 
level, exploiting the post-retrieval updating characteristics of memory.   
 A note of caution is in order here.  Similar to many existing experiments demonstrating 
reconsolidation-like effects, it is not possible to know whether our reactivation-relearning 
manipulation impaired memory performance by weakening the original memory (i.e., a storage 
deficit) or by impairing its retrieval.  It is also unknown whether different retrieval environments 
or subject factors [e.g., differences in overall suggestibility (53), differences in executive 
functioning (54)] can protect one from the present forgetting effect.  Thus, further research is 
needed to clarify the boundary conditions of our findings.  But these data represent an important 
step towards a fuller understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the plasticity of 
declarative memory in humans.  Knowing the limits and operating characteristics of 
reconsolidation blockage in declarative memory can have a profound impact on how memory is 
conceived theoretically.  These data also further bolster the idea that reconsolidation plays a 
fundamental role in the formation and maintenance of memory in humans. 
14 
Methods 
Subjects.  All subjects were recruited from the Iowa State University community and they 
received either partial course credit or a payment of $15 for their participation.  All participants 
were native English speakers. 
Materials and Procedure.  In all experiments, subjects viewed a ~40 min video about a terrorist 
attack (the original learning phase).  The video was the pilot episode of the television drama 
“24.”  Subjects were given intentional learning instructions prior to watching the video.  
Reactivation of the original memory was then manipulated by having participants complete a 
cued recall test of the video (the reactivation condition) or play the videogame Tetris (the no-
reactivation condition).  During the recall test, subjects were asked 24 questions about the video 
(e.g., What does the terrorist use on the flight attendant?) and they had 25 sec to answer each 
question.  No feedback was provided during this reactivation phase.  After a filled delay during 
which subjects completed a working memory task (see fig. 1 for the exact delay implemented in 
each experiment), participants listened to an 8 min audio narrative that purportedly recapped the 
video (the relearning phase).  However, among the 24 details queried during the reactivation 
phase, eight were presented incorrectly, and these details (misinformed items) replaced the 
original information (e.g., in the video, a terrorist knocked a flight attendant unconscious with a 
hypodermic syringe, but the narrative described the weapon as a stun gun).  Eight other details 
that were queried during the reactivation phase were not mentioned during the narrative (neutral 
items), and the remaining eight details were re-presented correctly during the narrative (re-
presented items).  Refer to fig. S1 for data regarding the re-presented items.  Participants were 
not informed about any inaccuracies and all information in the narrative was presented as fact.  
After a retention interval (which was 5 min in Experiments 1-5 and 24 hr in Experiment 6), 
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memory of the video was assessed in a final test.  We devised a special true/false recognition test 
to estimate the accessibility of the original memory (55, 56).  Recall tests are not suitable for our 
purpose because participants can withhold responses based on various metacognitive control 
processes (31, 57), making assessment of the true strength of a memory difficult.  In the 
recognition test, participants encountered one statement during each trial and indicated whether 
the statement was true (e.g., The terrorist used a hypodermic syringe on the flight attendant) or 
false (e.g., The terrorist used a chloroform rag on the flight attendant).  Critically, the 
misinformation (e.g., the stun gun) was never presented during this recognition test so that 
performance would not be influenced by non-memory based factors (e.g., demand 
characteristics).  In Experiment 4, instead of this true/false recognition test, a source-free 
recognition test was administered.  Here, participants were told to make an “old” judgment if 
they remembered the event detail from either the original learning or the relearning phase; 
otherwise, they were to make a “new” judgment.  
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Footnotes 
* A recent study showed that emotional (but not nonemotional) declarative memory might need 
to reconsolidate upon retrieval (16).  However, this study did not obtain overt recall responses 
from participants during the memory reactivation phase, thus like many other human studies, it is 
not possible to ascertain that retrieval was attempted.  Moreover, the amnesic treatment 
(propranolol) was administered orally an hour before the memory reactivation phase.  Therefore, 
it is possible that, instead of blocking reconsolidation, propranolol exerted an influence on 
retrieval and produced a permanent effect on the memory (4). 
† To ensure relatively stable results in these conditional analyses, we included data from only 
participants who recalled at least three items correctly for both the neutral and misinformed items 
during the reactivation phase.  As such, the degrees of freedom for these analyses are smaller 
than those of the analyses that included all items (df Exp 1 = 52, df Exp 3 = 10, df Exp 4 = 27, df Exp 6 = 
14).   
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1.  Timeline of the experimental procedure.  Arrows at the bottom of the figure 
indicate major methodological changes for Experiments 2-6. 
Figure 2.  Performance during the memory reactivation phase of Experiments 1-6.  
Figure 3.  Reactivation is required for targeted impairment of existing declarative memory.  
Each bar is the difference in recognition accuracy between the misinformed (relearned) items 
and the neutral (not-relearned) items.  The white bars indicate performance in the no-reactivation 
condition and the gray bars indicate performance in the reactivation condition.  A negative score 
indicates poorer memory following relearning.  As can be seen, relearning produced no 
forgetting of the original memory when it was not preceded by reactivation in any of the 
experiments.  However, in experiments where reconsolidation associated amnesia was expected 
(as indicated by asterisks), the retrieval-relearning procedure led to substantial impairment of the 
original memory.  Error bars display 95% confidence interval. 
 



